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Abstract
We investigate the extent to which price updates can increase the revenue of a seller with little prior
information on demand. We study prior-free revenue maximization for a seller with unlimited supply of
n item types facing m myopic buyers present for k< logn days. For the static (k = 1) case, Balcan et
al. [2] show that one random item price (the same on each item) yields revenue within a Θ(logm+logn)
factor of optimum and this factor is tight.
We introduce hereditary maximizers, a novel property regarding buyer valuations that is sufficient
for a significant improvement of the approximation factor in the dynamic (k > 1) setting. The hered-
itary maximizers property limits complementarities among items and is satisfied by any multi-unit or
gross substitutes valuation. Our main result is a non-increasing, randomized, schedule of k item prices,
the same on each item, with expected revenue within a O( logm+logn
k
) factor of optimum for private
valuations with hereditary maximizers. This factor is tight (modulo a constant factor): we show that
any pricing scheme over k days has a revenue approximation factor of at least logm+logn
3k
. We obtain
analogous matching lower and upper bounds of Θ( logn
k
) if all valuations have the same maximum. We
expect the technique we develop to prove our upper bound to be of broader interest; for example, it can
be used to significantly improve over the result of [1].
We also initiate the study of revenue maximization given allocative externalities (i.e. influences)
between buyers with combinatorial valuations. We provide a rather general model of positive influence
of others’ ownership of items on a buyer’s valuation. For affine, submodular externalities and valuations
with hereditary maximizers we present an influence-and-exploit [13] marketing strategy based on our
algorithm for private valuations. This strategy preserves our approximation factor, despite an affine
increase (due to externalities) in the optimum revenue.
1 Introduction
In most transactions, prices are set on items (and not on bundles of items) to simplify buyers’ and sellers’
decisions. Arguably, a seller’s prevalent objective is to maximize revenue–this basic problem has received
tremendous attention in the optimization literature. The seller often has poor information about uncertain
demand, but still desires a mechanism robust to errors or omissions in its data.
Given a set of buyers and their valuations for bundles, the optimum revenue is the total value of the optimal
allocation. Posted prices that obtain such a high revenue do not usually exist, because buyers’ valuations are
private and may be quite complex. A standard compromise [2, 3, 7] is then to aim for revenue that is at least
(possibly in expectation) a fraction 1/c of the optimum for any set of buyers, or, more formally, to design
algorithms with a low revenue approximation factor c > 1.
We focus on unlimited supply [2, 3], a setting relevant to digital media (e.g. DVDs or software programs). A
seller has unlimited supply of n item types if the marginal cost of producing an additional copy of any item
is negligible. For unlimited supply, the highest possible revenue equals the sum of the maxima of buyers’
valuations. Assuming that the seller only knows an upper bound on the m buyers’ arbitrary valuations,
Balcan et al. [2] provide a one-shot randomized price (the same for each item) that yields revenue at least a
Θ(1/(logm+ log n)) fraction of the optimum; they also show that this factor is tight for m=1 buyer.
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In practice buyers purchase more than once from the same seller. It is then natural to investigate improved
approximation factors if all buyers are present for k<n time periods, that we call days.
Like [2], we price all items equally, i.e. we use linear uniform prices. This involves the least price discrim-
ination possible under static pricing: no buyer or item is favored over another. In fact, some online movie
retailers (e.g. iTunes) have very limited variability in prices – iTunes offers only two prices for movies,
older movies having a discount. Prices must typically be decided before observing demand. In a dynamic
setting like ours, the seller may update prices “on the fly” based on realized demand. For simplicity we only
consider, like [2, 3], price sequences decided ahead of time, but only revealed gradually to buyers.
A buyer starts out with no items and accumulates them over time. We assume that any buyer is forward-
myopic, i.e. purchases a preferred set in each day without reasoning about future price reductions. If buyers
could wait for the lowest price p in a sequence P, P would be just as effective as p.
We are now ready to state the central question in this paper
Question: What revenue approximation factor Cm,n,k is achievable with
m forward-myopic buyers, n items in unlimited supply and k equal item prices?
Balcan et al. [2]’s results can be re-stated as Cm,n,1=O(logm+log n) and C1,n,1=Θ(log n).
We provide a general lower bound and an upper bound on the revenue factor achievable (we introduce in
detail these results and define these valuations shortly).
Answer:
{
Even for public concave multi-unit valuations, logm+log n3k ≤Cm,n,k
For private valuations with hereditary maximizers, Cm,n,k=O( logm+log nk )
We show that no scheme with k successive prices can approximate revenue to a factor less than logm+logn3k ,
even for concave multi-unit (i.e. that do not differentiate items) valuations. Such valuations are among the
most basic combinatorial valuations, rendering our lower bound quite powerful.
Our main result however is a positive one, providing a matching upper bound. We show that generating k
independent random prices and offering them in decreasing order (with the same price on each item in a
given day) approximates revenue to no worse than a Θ( logm+log nk ) fraction, thus improving [2]’s approxi-
mation by a Θ(k) factor. Our technical contribution is to generalize a guarantee on the expected profit from
one random price to k such prices. While the bound for one price uses a standard technique for worst-case
bounds, the only improvement for general k that we are aware of (by Akhlaghpour et al. [1]) is exponentially
worse than ours as their recursive construction only yields a Θ(log k) factor improvement. We connect rev-
enue from a valuation v with the joint area of k rectangles, determined by prices, under v’s demand curve F .
While each such rectangle covers in expectation a logarithmic fraction of the area under F , we are able to
limit the overlaps of rectangles by carefully analyzing the k prices as order statistics. If all valuations have
the same maximum (or obviously if m = nO(1)), then we can improve our two bounds to Θ( lognk ).
Our upper bound (in particular our connection between revenue and area under demand curve covered by
price-based rectangles) relies on the natural sufficient condition (that we identify) of buyer valuations having
hereditary maximizers (HM). The HM property essentially states that an algorithm greedily selecting items
by their marginal value has at each step a set of maximum value. In particular, multi-unit (not necessarily
concave) valuations and gross substitutes valuations (a classical model in economics, see e.g. [5, 10]) have
HM. We discuss these and other natural HM valuations in Section 4.
Submodular valuations may not have HM, leading to a counter-intuitive phenomenon: the revenue from
offering a high price followed by a low one may be less than the revenue from the low one only. Consider
three movies: a very good science-fiction (S) one and an animation (A) movie and a drama (D), both of
slightly inferior quality. A typical family prefers S to A or D, but A and D (for variety) to any other pair;
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the family does not strategize about price schedules. If a greedy movie retailer starts with high prices and
reduces them afterwards (on all movies) then, despite good revenue on S, it loses the opportunity of more
revenue by selling A and D instead. This (submodular) valuation, formalized in Section 2.1, does not have
HM. For HM valuations however, this counter-intuitive reversal does not occur, which is critical, as we
show, for good sequential revenue.
In the final section of the paper, we allow a buyer’s valuation for a set of items to depend on the others’ own-
ership of copies of (possibly different) items. In economic language, others exert an allocative1 externality
on a buyer’s value. Movie distribution services (e.g. Netflix) exploit such effects, allowing users to befriend
each other and to observe which movies they watched (and their rating).
We introduce a prior-free model of externalities and extend our algorithm for private valuations. Our model
departs from existing [1, 13] revenue maximization problems in the presence of externalities in two aspects,
that, in our view, allow for more generality. First, there is more than one item type for sale, which requires
a new language for expressing externalities. We introduce such a language that extends [1, 13]; it allows
a buyer to express a positive, affine influence by others that is monotone and submodular in their bundles.
Second, we assume only certain properties of the valuation functions, as opposed to values drawn from a
(known) distribution. We obtain an algorithm with the same approximation ratio as without externalities,
despite an affine increase in the optimum. Our algorithm is an influence-and-exploit (IE) strategy, introduced
by Hartline et al. [13]. In an IE strategy, a set S of buyers is given some items for free and then other
customers are charged a price that exploits other owners’ (a superset of S) influence on the items’ value.
Related work. Revenue maximization has been studied with and without priors on buyer valuations and
with limited or unlimited supply. The prior-free, unlimited supply domains studied have been less general
than the one in this paper. Balcan et al. [2] present structural results for one-shot unlimited supply pricing and
arbitrary valuations no higher than H . They achieve a tight Θ(logm+log n)-factor revenue approximation
via a single random price. Bansal et al. [3] study sequential pricing for unlimited supply of one item type and
buyers with values in [1,H] and arrival–departure intervals. They obtain almost matching upper and lower
bounds on the approximation factor: O(logH) for deterministic schemes and O(log logH) for randomized
schemes. Guruswami et al. [11] present static logarithmic revenue approximations via envy-free pricing for
two settings: single-minded buyers for unlimited supply and unit-demand buyers for limited supply. The
only dynamic version they consider concerns gradually-expiring items and buyers with arrival-departure
intervals. Chakraborty et al. [7] achieve a O(log2 n)-factor revenue approximation via dynamic equal item
prices, improving the limited supply factor in [2]. Unlike us, they consider a limited supply setting and
assume that buyers are impatient and have subadditive valuations. Hajiaghayi et al. [12] obtain constant
factor revenue approximations via adaptive pricing for limited supply of a good and buyer values from a
distribution. Chawla et al. [8] present constant-factor revenue approximation schemes via sequential posted
prices in prior-based domains.
While externalities are natural and well-studied in social networks [15], the corresponding revenue maxi-
mization problem has been recently introduced by Hartline et al. [13], who investigate approximation via
single-item distribution-based influence-and-exploit marketing strategies. Akhlaghpour et al. [1] study this
problem for a seller that cannot use price discrimination amongst buyers. Jehiel and Moldovanu [14] find
that many classical results no longer hold when externalities (allocative or informational) arise in auctions.
Paper structure. After introducing notation in Section 2, we review known bounds on Cm,n,k and provide
a new lower bound in Section 3. Section 4 analyzes hereditary maximizers, a property of valuations leading
to a Cm,n,k upper bound established in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6, we model externalities, where a
buyer’s valuation depends on others’ items, and extend Section 5’s approximation.
1As opposed to informational or financial externalities [14], where a valuation depends on others’ information (e.g. signals of
the item’s quality) or on their payments.
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2 Preliminaries
We consider a seller with n item types in unlimited supply. The seller can thus profit from selling copies
of an item at any price but aims to maximize its revenue. The seller has k < n sale opportunities called
days. There are m customers with quasilinear utilities present in all k days. Customers have valuations
over bundles of items (not more than one per type); we denote a generic such valuation2 by vi : 21..n→R.
and its maximum by Hi. We assume that the seller knows only the highest maximum across customers
H= maxiHi=maxi∈1..m,S⊆1..nvi(S).
We treat static pricing first and then dynamic pricing in Section 2.1. We only use the simplest form of
pricing, with no item or buyer discrimination. A price vector p∈Rn is linear uniform3 if pj=p, ∀ j=1..n.
Given a price vector, a customer buys a preferred (utility-maximizing) bundle.
Definition 1 For price vector p ∈ Rn, the demand correspondence [10] Dv(p) of valuation v is the set of
utility-maximizing bundles at prices p:
Dv(p) = argmaxS⊆1..n{v(S)−
∑
j∈S pj} (1)
For linear uniform price p= p · 1, let Dv(p) =Dv(p)and Fv(p) =minS∈D(p·1)|S|be the least number of
items in a bundle demanded (by valuation4 v) at prices p.
As one would expect, a higher price cannot increase the least quantity bought.
Lemma 1 (Balcan et al.[2]) For an arbitrary valuation v and p>p′, F (p)≤F (p′).
2.1 Sequential pricing
Assume the seller offers equal item prices rd ∈ R+ in day d = 1..k, with r1> . . . > rk. We now define
customer behavior over time, starting with no items before day 1.
We model any buyer as forward-myopic: assume that before day d he buys sets S1, . . . ,Sd−1. His utility for
itemsS⊆1..n\(S1∪. . .∪ Sd−1)he does not own is
ud,...,1(S1,. . ., Sd−1, S, r
1 . . . rd) = v(S1∪. . .∪Sd−1∪S)−(
∑d−1
l=1 r
l|Sl|)−r
d|S| (2)
i.e. a customer does not anticipate price drops but does take into account past purchases (accumulating
items) and payments to decide a utility-maximizing set S to buy today. In this model, a customer buys
nothing in a day where the price increases5, hence our focus on decreasing price sequences: the seller starts
with a high price and then gradually reveals discounts, a common retail practice.
Following Def. 1, we denote preferred bundles outside S1∪. . . ∪ Sd−1 at rd by
D
S1,...,Sd−1
v (r
1 . . . rd) = argmax
S⊆1..n\(S1∪···∪Sd−1)
ud,...,1(S1, . . . , Sd−1, S, r
1 . . . rd)
We briefly consider incentive properties before focusing on revenue only.
Incentive considerations. A buyer’s utility cannot decrease in any day: there is always the option of not
buying anything. Thus, any sequence of prices defines an individually rational mechanism. Furthermore,
within a day, as each buyer faces the same prices, buyers have no envy and no profitable item swaps.
Our goal is revenue maximization via (possibly randomized) price sequences decided ahead of time (but
only revealed gradually to buyers).
2A valuation is constant over time, apart from Section 6, where it varies with others’ items.
3Different (non-uniform) item prices are also (e.g. [5]) called linear prices.
4Except for Section 6, v will be clear from context and omitted from D and F .
5 We sketch a proof for d = 2: let r1 < r2 and Si bought in day i = 1, 2 with S1 ∩S2 = ∅. Suppose S2 6= ∅; then
v(S1∪∅)−r
1|S1|−r
2|∅|≤v(S1 ∪ S2)−r
1|S1|−r
2|S2|<v(S1 ∪ S2)−r
1|S1|−r
2|S2|, i.e. S1 ∪ S2 is preferred to S1 at price r1,
contradiction.
Definition 2 A pricing schemeP is a sequence6 of k (possibly random) decreasing prices. RevP(v1,. . ., vm)
denotes P’s revenue (in expectation for randomized P), for valuations v1,. . ., vm and least favorable tie-
breaking decisions by buyers.
A standard [2, 13] revenue benchmark is customers’ total willingness to pay. We study worst-case guaran-
tees, that hold regardless of buyer valuations.
Definition 3 A (possibly randomized) pricing scheme P is a c-revenue approximation (where c ≥ 1) if∑
i∈1..mmaxS⊆1..n vi(S) ≤
7 c ·E[RevP(v1, . . . , vm)] for all valuations v1 . . . vm, where the expectation is
taken over P’s random choices.
Recall that this paper’s central question is to assess what revenue approximation factors Cm,n,k are achiev-
able. Clearly, Cm,n,k+1≤Cm,n,k and Cm,n,k≤Cm+1,n,k. The next section formally states known values of
Cm,n,k for particular (m,n, k) triples, provides some intuition for sequential pricing and presents our lower
bound Cm,n,k = Ω( logm+lognk ). The upper bound Cm,n,k = O(
logm+logn
k ) is presented in Section 5.
3 Existing bounds for Cm,n,k and a new lower bound
We start by reviewing known or basic results on Cm,n,k for simple instances of our setting: first for one-shot
pricing, then for one item only and finally for public valuations, which will also yield a new lower bound.
Motivated by [2]’s bounds (re-stated in Lemma 2 below) and other worst-case results [3], we use prices
ql = H/2
l for l ≥ 0
Algorithm RANDOMHD outputs one-shot price ql where the scaling exponent l is chosen uniformly at random
in 0..D−1. Despite its simplicity, RANDOMHD is quite effective in general and as effective as any other
algorithm for one buyer.
Lemma 2 [2] For8 t=1+logm+log n, RANDOMHt is a 4t-revenue approximation. For one buyer, i.e. m=1,
this factor is tight (modulo a constant factor). Thus, Cm,n,1=O(logm+log n) and C1,n,1=Θ(log n).
Bansal et al. [3] study sequential revenue maximization for unlimited supply of one item (as in our setting,
buyers are interested in one copy only). While they assume, as we do, that values are at most H , they also
assume, unlike us, that values are at least 1. They essentially show that k=1+logH days are enough for
obtaining at least half of the maximum revenue. More precisely, RANDOMH1+logH is a 2-approximation to
revenue, i.e. Cm,1,1+logH=2 for such values.
For the rest of this section we assume that the seller fully knows buyers’ valuations. This strong assumption
will allow us to understand two special settings.
The first setting is concerned with one buyer m=1 with a known monotone (H= v(1..n)) valuation v and
many days k=n. In this setting, full revenue can be obtained from v i.e. C1,n,n = 1. Let set Sd be bought
in day d = 0..n, with S0 = ∅. Let item i∗d ∈ argmaxi 6∈Sd v(Sd∪{i}) with the highest marginal value given
Sd. Then, at price rd= v(Sd∪{i∗d})−v(Sd) in day d∈1..n, exactly9 item i∗d is bought (ignoring ties). The
sum of all days’ revenues telescopes to v(1..n)=H .
The second setting yields the first half of our answer to this paper’s central question: a lower bound on
achievable Cm,n,k. This lower bound shows the effect of limited (k) price updates and buyer differences,
even if valuations are known and items are identical.
6 We can expand, without changing revenue, any shorter sequence P to k prices by appending to P copies of its last price.
7This benchmark is at leastmaxS⊆1..n
∑
i∈1..mvi(S), i.e.the highest joint value of a set.
8This paper only uses base 2 logarithms.
9Here we also assumev submodular; if not, we can set rd to v’s steepest slope at Sd.
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Theorem 1 (lower bound) Define vs(x) =
{
x/2s−1, if x ≤ 2s−1
1, if x > 2s−1 ∀ 1≤s ≤N+1 (for N=log n ∈ Z) to
be 1 + log n concave multi-unit valuations, each with maximum 1: v1(x) = 1, ∀x = 1..n and vN+1(x) =
x/2N = x/n, ∀x = 1..n. Then the revenue of any sequence of k< log n prices is at most 2k. Thus, even if
valuations have the same maximum, any k-day pricing algorithm must have a higher revenue approximation
factor than 1+log n2k , even for 1+log n buyers: 1+logn2k ≤ Cequal maxima1+logn,n,k . In general, Cm,n,k = Ω( logm+lognk ).
Informally, each vs has a constant non-zero marginal value (MV) for one item in [1/n, 1]. A low price is
effective for low MV buyers but could profit more from high MV buyers. A high price fails to sell any
item to low MV buyers despite getting good revenue from high MV buyers. This reasoning extends to short
(k< log n) sequences of prices.
Proof:The maximum revenue from v1..vN+1 is N+1. We claim that no sequence of k prices can yield
revenue above 2k. Any such sequence can be replaced by 1/2l1 , 1/2l2 , . . . , 1/2lk with 0≤ l1<l2<. . .lk≤N
without decreasing revenue.10
A price 1/2l presented to a valuation vs yields revenue 2s−1/2l otherwise (all 2s−1 items being bought) if
s− 1 ≤ l (i.e. if 1/2l ≤ 1/2s−1) and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the revenue from a price pair 1/2l1 , 1/2l2 with
l1 < l2 is 0 if s− 1 > l2, 2s−1/2l1 if s− 1 ≤ l1 and 2s−1/2l2 if s− 1 ∈ (l1, l2]. The total revenue is then∑l1+1
s=1 2
s−1/2l1 +
∑l2+1
s=l1+2
2s−1/2l2 + . . .+
∑lk+1
s=lk−1+2
2s−1/2lk
= (2l1+1−1)/2l1 + (2l2+1−2l1+1)/2l2 + . . .+ (2lk+1−2lk−1+1)/2lk ≤ 2k
Let m′ = m−1−logn and assume that m′ > 0. Let unit-demand single-minded valuations wt for t = 1..m′
such that wt(x) = wt(1) = 1t , ∀x = 1..n. Then any k prices can obtain total revenue at most k from
valuations w1..wm′ whose optimal revenue is Θ(logm′).
For the m=m′+1+logn valuations vs and wt together, we get that no set of k prices obtains more than 3k
revenue, but optimum is Θ(log n) + Θ(log(m−log n))=Θ(logm+log n) i.e., Cm,n,k=Ω( logm+lognk ). 
For k=1, we get Cm,n,1=Θ(logm+log n), showing that Balcan et al. [2]’s bound Cm,n,1=O(logm+log n)
is tight (they only prove it for m = 1).
After this section we will provide positive results only. In preparation however, we need another piece of
bad news highlighting the importance of sequential consistency.
Even the seemingly innocuous assumption of decreasing prices can hurt revenue. We now provide a sub-
modular valuation consistent with the movie example in the introduction and find that the revenue from a
high, followed by a low, price may be below that of the better single price.
Example 1 Let a be the science-fiction movie, and b, c be the animation and drama. Define a valuation v
by v(a)=3, v(b)=v(c)=2.1, v(a, b)=v(a, c)=3.8, v(b, c)=v(a, b, c)=4.2. For r1=1.5, D(r1)={{a}}
and for r2 = 1,D(r2) = {{b, c}}. Neither b or c is worth $1 given a: D{a}(r1, r2) = {∅}. Less revenue
($1.5) is obtained from offering r1 followed by r2 than from r2 alone ($2).
In Example 1, v(1) > max(v(2), v(3)) and v(23) > max(v(12), v(13)). The following example shows
that revenue does not decrease for any two prices (and thus any price sequence) for another monotone
submodular non-GS valuation. Eq. (4) is violated, but unlike in Example 1, only one of v(1) and v(23) is
higher than the value of both other bundles of same size.
10 Any price (or price sequence) in (1/2l+1, 1/2l) for l∈1..N+1 can be replaced by 1/2l while preserving the quantity bought
by any vs as vs’s marginal values equal 1/2s−1.
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Section 4 introduces a valuation class for which the revenue from any sequence of prices r1 > · · · > rk is
at least that from the best ri, in contrast to Example 1. This property will yield revenue guarantees for our
pricing scheme in Section 5.
4 Hereditary maximizers
In this section we define hereditary maximizers, a new property of valuations and we show that it holds
for a few classical domains of valuations including gross substitutes and multi-unit demand valuations. In
Section 5 we will show that this property is sufficient for good sequential revenue.
Definition 4 Valuation v has hereditary maximizers (HM) if given any size j value-maximizing bundle Sj ,
one item can be added to it to obtain a size j+1 such bundle. Letting Mvj=argmax|S|=j v(S), v has HM if
∀n≥j≥1, ∀Sj ∈ M
v
j ,∃Sj+1 ∈ M
v
j+1 with Sj ⊂ Sj+1 (HM)
implying ∀n≥j′>j≥1, ∀Sj ∈ Mvj ,∃Sj′ ∈ Mvj′ with Sj ⊂ Sj′ (HM∗)
Thus, a valuation has hereditary maximizers if a greedy algorithm selecting the highest marginal value item
at each step always maintains, regardless of its tie-breaking decisions, a set of maximum value among sets
of the same size. Example 1’s valuation v does not have HM: Mv1={{a}} but Mv2={{b, c}}.
However, a few well-studied classes of valuation functions are HM as we show shortly. Multi-unit valuations
are one of the most basic combinatorial valuations. A multi-unit valuation v treats all the items identically.
Consequently, for any j, Mvj is the collection of all sets of size j and thus v trivially has HM.
Lemma 3 A multi-unit valuation has hereditary maximizers.
A valuation is gross substitutes, a well-studied condition in assignment problems [5, 10], if raising prices on
some items preserves the demand on other items.
Definition 5 A valuation v is gross substitutes (GS) if for any price vectors11 p′ ≥ p, and any A ∈ D(p)
there exists A′ ∈ D(p′) with A′ ⊇ {i ∈ A : pi = p′i}.
Remarkably [10], for any set of GS buyers with public valuations, there exists a Walrasian (or competitive)
equilibrium with one-shot item (possibly non-uniform) prices, i.e. at which buyers’ preferred bundles form a
partition of all items. Among GS valuation classes (see [16] for more examples) are unit demand valuations
(that define the value of a set as the highest value of an item within the set) and concave multi-unit demand
valuations. We know from Lemma 3 that the latter valuations have HM – this is not a coincidence.
Theorem 2 [4] A gross substitutes valuation has hereditary maximizers.
Bertelsen [4] implicitly proves Theorem 2, without defining HM. Appendix A provides a simpler proof for
it via a basic graph-theoretic fact starting, like [4], from Lien and Yan’s [16] GS characterization (Lemma 8
in Appendix A). The sets Mvj have more structure for a GS v.12 The high-level idea of Theorem 2’s proof
is as follows. We define a (bipartite) directed graph among certain sets of equal size; an edge from set S to
set S′ shows that S has a strictly higher certain marginal value in v than S′. If v did not have HM, then this
graph would have a directed cycle which is impossible.
We now exhibit a few valuation classes that are HM, but not GS (properties proved in Appendix B). They
attest to the richness of our HM class, even when compared to the well-studied GS class. Intuitively, item
complementarities are severely limited by the GS property and to a lesser extent by the HM property.
11We compare price vectors p,p′∈Rn component-wise: p′≥p ⇐⇒ p′j ≥ pj ∀ j = 1..n.
12 E.g. if ({a} ∈ M1 and {b, c} ∈ M2) then ({b} ∈ M1 and {a, c} ∈ M2) or ({c} ∈ M1 and {a, b} ∈ M2)
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order-consistent For any L ∈ 1..n and any sets {j1, . . . , jL} and {j′1, . . . , j′L}, whenever v({jl}) ≥
v({j′l}), ∀ l = 1..L then v({j1, . . . , jL}) ≥ v({j′1, . . . , j′L}), with strict inequality if at least one
single item inequality is strict.
sequence-based Assume that all items form a series (of e.g. episodes) and any item is valued at 1. Then
the value of a set S equals |S| plus a function increasing in the number of consecutive items in S.
pair-based Assume that items are partitioned into pairs (e.g. movie–sequel) and any item is valued at 1.
The value of a set S equals |S| plus a function increasing in the number of such pairs in S.
We proceed with a quantity guarantee for HM valuations, that will be critical for guarantees on sequential
revenue. No fewer items are sold for price sequence r1, . . . , rd (regardless of which preferred bundles are
bought) than in the worst-case for rd alone, i.e. F (rd). This guarantee follows from a strong structural
property, that we highlight for d=2. Any set S1∈D(r1) (i.e. preferred at a higher linear uniform price r1)
can serve as base to create sets preferred at the lower price r2 < r1 via joining any set S2∈DS1(r1, r2) (i.e.
preferred sequentially at r2 after buying S1): formally, S2 ∪ S1∈D(r2).
Theorem 3 Fix an HM valuation v, a day d ≤ k and prices r1 > · · · > rd. Let Sδ∈DS1,...,Sδ−1(r1, . . . , rδ)
preferred at rδ given sets S1,. . . ,Sδ−1 sequentially bought at r1,. . ., rδ−1 ∀ δ=1..d. Then
⋃d
δ=1Sδ ∈D(r
d)
and thus
∑d
δ=1|Sδ|≥F (r
d).
We first state a property needed in Theorem 3’s proof. Clearly, a size j set (if any) preferred at a uniform
price cannot have a higher value than another size j set.
Lemma 4 For all prices r and sizes j, D(r)∩{|S| = j} is either empty or Mvj .
Proof:[of Theorem 3] We treat the case d = 2; the claims for general d follow similarly.
Let S1∈D(r1) be a set preferred at price r1 and assume |S1| < F (r2) (otherwise the claim is immediate).
Let S2 ∈ DS1(r1, r2) be a set preferred at price r2 after having bought S1 at price r1. By Lemma 4,
S1 ∈ M∅,|S1|. As F (r2) > |S1|, by (HM∗), ∃S′2 ∈ M∅,F (r2) a minimal set preferred at price r2 with
S1 ⊂ S
′
2. As M∅,F (r2) ∩ D(r2) 6= ∅ (it contains S′2), by Lemma 4, S′2 ∈ D(r2).
Let uS = v(S ∪S1)− r1|S1|− r2|S| be the utility from buying S ⊆ 1..n\S1 at r2 after buying S1 at r1. As
S2∈D
S1(r1, r2), uS′2\S1 −uS2 = (v(S
′
2)− r
2|S′2|)− (v(S2 ∪S1)− r
2|S2 ∪S1|) ≤ 0. If uS′2\S1<uS2 then
S2 ∪ S1 is preferred to S′2 at r2, contradicting S′2∈D(r2). Thus uS′2\S1 =uS2 implying S2 ∪ S1∈D(r
2). 
We see that Theorem 3 relies on the HM property: its conclusions fail for Example 1’s non-HM submodular
valuation. A much weaker statement (proved in Appendix C) than Theorem 3 holds for such valuations.
Lemma 5 For a submodular valuation v, if S1 ∈ D(r1), S2 ∈ DS1(r1, r2) and S′2 ∈ D(r2) then S2 6⊃
S′2\S1 (note that equality is allowed).
5 Revenue approximation for independent HM valuations
We now leverage Theorem 3’s guarantees to obtain a revenue approximation, complementing our 1+logn2k ≤
Cm,n,k lower bound for 1+log n≤m. Let L = 1 + logm+ log n.
Theorem 4 (upper bound) Consider m HM valuations with maxima H1. . .Hm and let H =maxi∈1..mHi.
Consider k prices qx1 = H2x1 ≥ · · · ≥ qxk =
H
2xk where x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xk are the first (lowest), . . . , k-th(highest) order statistics of k iid U [0, L] continuous random variables u1, . . . , uk. These prices (sorted
decreasingly) yield expected revenue Ω( klogm+logn)
∑
i∈1..mHi. Thus Cm,n,k=O(
logm+logn
k ).
If valuations have the same maximum (Hi = H, ∀ i ∈1..m) then, as in [2], the approximation factor can be
improved to Ω( lognk ) by using L = log(2n). Recalling Theorem 1’s lower bounds, we see that our bounds
are tight modulo a constant factor.
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Before proceeding with Theorem 4’s proof, we review, motivated by Lemma 1, a natural analogue of a
well-studied economic concept and relate it to H .
A valuation v’s demand curve [2] is a step function given by (pl, F (pl))l=0..nv+1 (with nv≤n) where thresh-
old prices 0 = p0 <p1 < .. < pnv ≤ pnv+1 =H satisfy F (pl) = F (p) > F (pl+1), ∀ p ∈ [pl, pl+1), ∀ l =
0..nv. That is, for any l and any price p in [pl, pl+1] the lowest size of a (preferred) bundle inDv(p) is F (pl).
The area AF under v’s demand curve is defined as
∑nv
l=1 pl(F (pl)− F (pl+1)).
Lemma 6 [2] AF = H = maxS⊆1..n v(S), i.e. v’s maximum willingness to pay.
The (worst-case) revenue pF (p) from a single price p equals the part of AF covered by p. We now generalize
this to a sequence of prices. For instance, prices r1>r2 cover a F (r1)r1 + (F (r2)−F (r1))r2 part of AF ,
i.e. the area of the union of two rectangles with opposite corners (0, 0) and (ri, F (ri)).Note that no pricing
scheme can cover more than AF itself. However, as seen in Example 1, the area covered by a scheme with
at least two prices may be less than its revenue even for a submodular valuation.
Definition 6 The fraction of AF covered by a pricing scheme P with prices p′1>. . .>p′k is
(1/AF )
∑k
d=1 p
′
d(F (p
′
d)− F (p
′
d−1)) where F (p′0) = 0.
We are now ready for Theorem 4’s proof. It establishes that for HM valuations the revenue of a pricing
scheme P is at least the part of AF covered by P.
Proof:[of Theorem 4] We proceed with one buyer; linearity of expectation will then yield the claim. Let
qx1 ≥ . . .≥ qxk be the prices of Theorem 4 for H . Let set S′d ∈D
S′1,...,S
′
d−1(qx1 . . . qxd) be bought in day d.
By Theorem 3,
∑d
δ=1 |S
′
δ|≥F (qxd).
Via Lemma 7 with d0=1, d=k, qδ=qxδ and xδ=F (qxδ), revenue is at least
∑d
δ=1 qxδ(F (qxδ)−F (qxδ−1)),
i.e. the area covered by these prices. Theorem 5 will yield the approximation factor. 
We have reached the technical core of our approximation: the k random13 prices cover well in expectation
the area under the demand curve of a valuation. The area covered by the k prices is the sum of the areas
of each individual price minus the area covered by each of at least two prices. Theorem 5’s proof (in
Appendix D) uses properties of order statistics to upper bound the latter area. We note that Akhlaghpour et
al. [1] present a recursive construction that can be used to cover in expectation an Ω( log klogm+logn) fraction of
AF as opposed to our Ω( klogm+logn) factor.
Theorem 5 Consider k prices qx1 = H2x1 ≥ . . .≥ qxk =
H
2xk where x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xk are the first (smallest),
. . . , k-th (largest) order statistics of k iid continuous random variables u1, . . . , uk chosen uniformly at
random in [0, L]. Then these prices cover in expectation an Ω( klogm+log n) fraction of AF .
We finally provide a revenue guarantee given a guarantee on total quantities bought.
Lemma 7 If, at prices qd0>. . .>qd, at least xδ items (xd≥xd−1≥ . . .≥xd0≥xd0−1 = 0) are sold in total
up to each day δ = d0..d (e.g. at least xd0+1 items in days d0 and d0 + 1 together) then the revenue is at
least
∑d
δ=d0
qδ(xδ − xδ−1).
Proof: The lowest revenue is for exactly xδ items sold in day δ = d0..d and (as prices are decreasing) for
as few items as possible sold early, i.e. for xδ−xδ−1 items sold in day δ=d0..d. 
In practice, buyers do not only have patience, but also have an influence on other buyers. We allow now
a buyer’s value (for any bundle) to increase depending on others’ acquired bundles (but not on others’
valuations). We will preserve the revenue approximation factor, despite an increased optimum revenue.
13While Balcan et al. [2] also use prices of the form qx = H2x to achieve the Θ(logm + log n) factor for k = 1 day, we find it
more convenient to use continuous x’s (scaling factors) as opposed to integer.
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6 Positive allocative externalities
We now investigate revenue maximization in the presence of positive externalities, i.e. a buyer’s valuation
being increased by other buyers’ ownership of certain items. Such influences can be subjective, e.g. resulting
from peer pressure, or objective, e.g. resulting from ownership of a certain social network application.
We define a new influence model via a predicate I : 1..m→{false,true} such that I(i0) only depends
on seller’s assignment of items to buyer i0, e.g.
• I(i0) = true iff buyer i0 owns all (or, instead, at least two) items
• I(i0) = true iff buyer i0 owns his preferred bundle at current prices
Let Id be the buyers i0 satisfying I(i0) before day d. I is monotone if Id ⊆ Id+1.
We model the valuation in day d of a buyer i as a linear mapping (depending on d only through its argument
Id\{i}) of i’s base value
vdi (S|1..m\{i}) = (ai(Id\{i})vi(S))⊕ bi(Id\{i}), ∀ set S ⊆ 1..n (3)
where αvi(S)⊕ β = {αvi(S) ifS=∅ and14 αvi(S) + β ifS 6=∅} for α, β ∈ R.
Thus, ai(I) and bi(I) measure the multiplicative and additive influences that a buyer set I (satisfying I)
have on buyer i. Say i’s value for any DVD of a TV series doubles as soon as one other friend (in a set Fi)
has the entire series (the predicate I) and is then constant. Then ai(I) = 2⇐⇒ |I ∩Fi| ≥ 1 and bi(I) = 0.
Without any influence, a valuation reduces to the base value: ai(∅) = 1, bi(∅) = 0. Assume ai and bi are
non-negative, monotone and submodular15 . Also assume that ai, bi, vi are bounded: maxI⊆1..m\{i} ai(I) =
ai(1..m\{i}) = H
a, maxI bi(I) = bi(1..m\{i}) = H
b, maxS⊆1..n vi(S) = Hi with maxi∈1..mHi = H .
Our influence model is a distribution-free extension of single-item models [1, 13]. It does not require or
preclude symmetry, anonymity or a neighbor graph. For ai = 1, bi = 0 we recover the model before this
section. Buyers are still forward-myopic and do not strategize about which items to buy today so that other
buyers’ values increase, thus increasing their own value etc.
With positive externalities, a natural revenue maximization approach [13] is providing certain items for free
to some buyers and then charging others accordingly.
Definition 7 The influence-and-exploit IEk marketing strategy for k ≥ 2 satisfies I (at no cost) for each
buyer with probability 0.5, in day 1. Let A1 be the set of buyers chosen in day 1. Independently of A1, k− 1
prices qx1 =
H+Hb/Ha
2x1 ≥ . . . ≥ qxk−1 =
H+Hb/Ha
2xk−1
where x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xk−1 are the first (smallest), . . . ,
(k−1)-th (largest) order statistics of k−1 iid continuous random variables u1,. . ., uk−1 chosen uniformly
at random in [0, L]. Each buyer i∈1..m\A1 is offered uniform item price Ha/3 · qxd−1 in day d≥2.
This section’s main result (proved in Appendix E), is that Theorem 4’s factor carries over to externalities,
despite the affine increase in the optimum revenue.
Theorem 6 The IEk strategy is an O( logm+lognk )-revenue approximation to the optimal marketing strategyfor a monotone I over IEk and HM base valuations.
The price schedule qx1 ≥ . . . ≥ qxk−1 is (by Theorem 4) a O( logm+lognk )-revenue approximation given
buyers’ base valuations (translated by Hb/3Ha/3 ). The proof establishes that the influence of other buyers (an
affine mapping of a buyer’s value in each day) does not result in fewer items being bought in the worst case.
14 Eq. (3) excludes the additive increase for S = ∅ so that vdi (∅|·) = 0. Also, if bi is much larger than aimaxS vi(S) then a
multiplicative revenue approximation is impossible: prices close to bi are needed, rendering ∅ the preferred set, i.e. zero revenue.
15Submodularity (non-increasing marginal influence) is often assumed for externalities [1, 13]. Positive, monotone externalities
are an instance of “herd mentality”.
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7 Conclusions and future directions
In this paper we study prior-free revenue maximization with sequences of equal item prices. We are the first
to consider combinatorial valuations for more than one item in unlimited supply in the sequential setting. We
provide a sufficient condition and an algorithm improving the revenue approximation factor of an existing
one-shot pricing scheme complemented by a lower bound that leverages the limited availability of price
updates. Our paper also initiates the study of revenue maximization for allocative externalities between
combinatorial valuations. For positive, non-anonymous externalities we present a simple marketing strategy
preserving the approximation factor without externalities, despite an increase in revenue available due to
such influences. Several open directions appear promising to us.
Hereditary maximizers guarantees consistency of bundles bought sequentially. We deem it of interest to find
an alternative assumption, perhaps related to sequential revenue instead, that still allows revenue bounds.
We assume fully patient, as opposed to instantaneous, buyers. Other patience models, e.g. arrival-departure
intervals [3], may yield alternative approximations. Finally, widespread externalities in applications present
many exciting open questions, both practical and theoretical, notably in multiple-item settings.
Acknowledgments. We thank Avrim Blum and Malvika Rao for detailed comments on earlier drafts of this
paper, Mark Braverman for helpful discussions and Daniel Lehmann for providing us with a copy of [4].
References
[1] H. Akhlaghpour, M. Ghodsi, N. Haghpanah, H. Mahini, V. Mirrokni, and A. Nikzad. Optimal iterative
pricing over social networks, 2009. Fifth Workshop on Ad Auctions.
[2] M.-F. Balcan, A. Blum, and Y. Mansour. Item pricing for revenue maximization. In Proc. ACM Conf.
on Electronic Commerce, pages 50–59, 2008.
[3] N. Bansal, N. Chen, N. Cherniavsky, A. Rudra, B. Schieber, and M. Sviridenko. Dynamic pricing for
impatient bidders. ACM Trans. Algorithms, 6(2):1–21, 2010.
[4] A. Bertelsen. Substitutes valuations and M ♮-concavity. Master’s thesis, Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, 2004.
[5] S. Bikhchandani and J. M. Ostroy. Ascending price Vickrey auctions. Games and Economic Behavior,
55(2):215–241, May 2006.
[6] P. Briest, M. Hoefer, and P. Krysta. Stackelberg network pricing games. In STACS, pages 133–142,
2008.
[7] T. Chakraborty, Z. Huang, and S. Khanna. Dynamic and non-uniform pricing strategies for revenue
maximization. In Foundations of Comp. Sci. (FOCS), 2009.
[8] S. Chawla, J. Hartline, D. Malec, and B. Sivan. Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential
posted pricing. In STOC, pages 311–320, 2010.
[9] H. David and H. Nagaraja. Order Statistics. Wiley, 2003.
[10] F. Gul and E. Stacchetti. Walrasian equilibrium with gross substitutes. Journal of Economic Theory,
87(1):95–124, 1999.
[11] V. Guruswami, J. Hartline, A. Karlin, D. Kempe, C. Kenyon, and F. McSherry. On profit-maximizing
envy-free pricing. In Proceedings of the Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA), pages 1164–
1173, 2005.
11
[12] M. T. Hajiaghayi, R. Kleinberg, and D. C. Parkes. Adaptive limited-supply online auctions. In Proc.
ACM Conf. on Electronic Commerce, pages 71–80, 2004.
[13] J. Hartline, V. Mirrokni, and M. Sundararajan. Optimal marketing over social networks. In Conference
on the World Wide Web (WWW08), 2008.
[14] P. Jehiel and B. Moldovanu. Allocative and informational externalities in auctions and related mecha-
nisms. In R. Blundell, W. K. Newey, and T. Persson, editors, Advances in economics and econometrics:
theory and applications. 2006.
[15] J. Kleinberg. Cascading behavior in networks: algorithmic and economic issues. Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2007.
[16] Y. Lien and J. Yan. On the gross substitutes condition. Working paper, Jul2007.
A Alternate proof of Theorem 2
Denote v’s conditioning on set S (measuring marginal value over S) by vS(A) = v(S ∪A)− v(S), ∀A ⊆
1..n\S.
As mentioned in Section 4, there is a more direct, valuation-based (as opposed to price-based as in Def. 5)
characterization of GS valuations.
Lemma 8 [16] v is gross substitutes if and only if v is submodular and
∀ items a, b, c,set S, vS(ab) + vS(c) ≤ max{vS(ac) + vS(b), vS(bc) + vS(a)} (4)
i.e. no unique maximizer among vS(ab) + vS(c), vS(ac) + vS(b), vS(bc) + vS(a).
For S=∅, this immediately leads to the observation in Footnote 12 in Section 4.
We now prove a slightly stronger result than Theorem 2’s claim in Section 4.
Theorem 2 A GS valuation v has hereditary maximizers fixing any base bundle already owned.
Proof: Suppose towards a contradiction that v did not have HM: i.e. for some Sj ∈ Mj no Sj+1 ∈ Mj+1
contains it. Choose Sj+1 with lowest |Sj\Sj+1|+ |Sj+1\Sj|.
For any set S, let vB
∩
(S) = v(Sj∩Sj+1)∪B(S) (simply v
∩
if B = ∅).
Assume that
maxx∈Sj\Sj+1 v∩({x}) ≥ maxx∈Sj+1\Sj v∩({x}) (5)
and let c1 ∈ argmaxx∈Sj\Sj+1 v∩({x}).
We prove inductively that for any L distinct items a1...aL ∈ Sj+1\Sj ,
∃l ∈ 1..L with v
∩
(a1, . . . , aL) ≤ v
∩
(a−l, c1) (6)
where a−l denotes a1...al−1al+1...aL. The theorem follows for L21 = |Sj+1\Sj |: v∩(S) is maximized by
Sj+1\Sj among sets of size L21. By Eq. (6), (Sj+1\{al})∪{c1} ∈ Mj+1 and has strictly fewer elements
in the symmetric difference with Sj than Sj+1, contradicting the choice of sets Sj and Sj+1.
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As a base case L = 1, Eq. (6) holds by choice of c1 as l = 1.
Assume that Eq. (6) holds for L− 1, and suppose it fails for L ≥ 2.
We define a directed bipartite graph GL−1,c1L−2 with vertices a−l for l = 1..L in one partition (that we call
PL−1) and c1a−h,l for 1 ≤ l < h ≤ L in the other partition (that we call Pc1L−2). Directed edge a → b in
GL−1,c1L−2 represents v∩(a) ≤ v∩(b), with strict inequality if a ∈ Pc1L−2 and b ∈ PL−1.
We show that in GL−1,c1L−2 each vertex has at least one outgoing edge, i.e. there exists a cycle of in-
equalities (at least half of them strict), contradiction. This claim holds for vertices in PL−1 by the inductive
hypothesis.
Fix 1 ≤ h < l ≤ L and c1a−h,l. The failure of Eq. (6) for L requires
v∩(a
1, ..., aL)>max{v∩(a
−l, c1), v∩(a
−h, c1)} i.e. (7)
va
−h,l
∩ (a
h, al)>max{va
−h,l
∩ (a
h, c1), v
a−h,l
∩ (a
l, c1)} implying, via Eq. (4) (8)
va
−h,l
∩
(c1)<max{v
a−h,l
∩
(ah), va
−h,l
∩
(al)} i.e. (9)
v
∩
(c1a
−h,l)<max{v
∩
(a−l), v
∩
(a−h)} (10)
exhibiting one outgoing edge from c1a−h,l, i.e. to a−l or a−h.
If Eq. (5) did not hold, then one can show as above, that for any L distinct items b1...bL ∈ Sj \Sj+1, and
c2 ∈ argmaxx∈Sj+1\Sj v∩({x})
∃l ∈ 1..L with v∩(b1, . . . , bL) < v∩(b−l, c2) (11)
For L = |Sj\Sj+1|, this contradicts Sj ∈ Mj . 
Bertelsen provides a stronger result: for a GS valuation v, the collection of sets Mvj for all j is a greedoid,
i.e. a collection F of subsets of 1..n that is accessible (i.e. ∀S ∈ F ,∃x ∈ S with S \{x} ∈ F) and
satisfies the augmentation property (∀S, S′ ∈ F with |S| < |S′|, ∃x ∈ S′\S with S∪{x} ∈ F). Clearly,
the maximum of an HM valuation without ties can be found efficiently via a greedy algorithm – Bertelsen
provides such an algorithm for a GS valuation that can also handle ties.
B Examples of HM, but not GS, valuations
order-consistent For any L ∈ 1..n and any sets {j1, . . . , jL} and {j′1, . . . , j′L}, whenever v({jl}) ≥
v({j′l}), ∀ l = 1..L then v({j1, . . . , jL}) ≥ v({j′1, . . . , j′L}), with strict inequality if any of the single
item inequalities is strict.
Order-consistent valuations are HM because the maximum value among size L valuations is attained
at exactly those sets with item values among L highest: say k = 3, v(1) = 3, v(2) = v(3) = 1.
Then an order-consistent valuation must have v(1, 2) = v(1, 3) > v(2, 3). This valuation is not GS
as Eq. (4) can be violated by setting v(1, 2) = v(1, 3) = 2, v(2, 3) = 1.
sequence-based Assume that all items form a series (of e.g. episodes) and that the value of any item is 1.
Then the valuation of a set S equals |S| plus a function that is increasing in the number of consecutive
items in S.
Sequence-based valuations are HM because the maximum value size L sets coincide with length L
sequences. They are not GS as v(1) + v(3, 4) > max{v(1, 3) + v(4), v(1, 4) + v(3)} contradicting
Eq. (4).
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pair-based Assume that items are partitioned into pairs (e.g. movie–sequel) and any item is valued at 1.
The value of a set S equals |S| plus a function increasing in the number of such pairs in S.
Pair-based valuations are HM because the maximum value size L sets coincide with sets with ⌊L2 ⌋
pairs. They are not HM as v(1) + v(3, 4) > max{v(1, 3) + v(4), v(1, 4) + v(3)} if {3, 4} is a pair,
contradicting Eq. (4).
We note that HM only contains single-minded valuations if the bundle of interest is of size 1: each buyer i
has a desired bundle Si such that v(S′) = v(Si) if S′ contains Si and v(S′) = 0 otherwise. Any bundle of
size |Si| − 1 has value 0, but only those included in Si can be augmented with one item to Si.
C Proof of Lemma 5
Proof:[of Lemma 5] By optimality of S2 after having bought S1,
v(S1 ∪ S2)− r
1|S1| − r
2|S2| ≥ v(S1 ∪ S)− r
1|S1| − r
2|S|, ∀S ⊆ {1..n}\S1
i.e. v(S1 ∪ S2)− r2|S2| ≥ v(S1 ∪ (S′2\S1))− r2|S′2\S1| for S = S′2\S1
Figure 1: Illustration of Theorem 2’s alternate proof for L=4. Graph G3,c12 has left-hand side partition P3
and right-hand side partition Pc12. Any edge from set S to set S′ encodes that S has a lower marginal value
than S′ over Sj ∩ Sj+1 where Sj and Sj+1 are value-maximizing sets of size j and j + 1 with minimum
symmetric difference i.e. lowest |Sj\Sj+1|+ |Sj+1\Sj |. Theorem 2’s alternate proof supposes Sj 6⊂ Sj+1
and obtains a contradiction via a cycle in G3,c12, using elements a1, a2, a3, a4, c1 not contained in Sj+1\Sj .
P3 contains one vertex for each set of 3 elements in Sj+1\Sj whereas Pc12 contains one vertex for each set
comprised of c1 and 2 elements in Sj+1\Sj .
By the induction hypothesis Eq. (6), there exists an edge (solid in the figure) from any vertex on the left to
some vertex on the right. Eqs. (7-10) establish that there is an outgoing edge (dashed in the figure) from
c1a
−h,l to a−h or a−l, for 1 ≤ l < h ≤ 4.
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By moving r2|S′2\S1| to the left-hand side and subtracting r2|S′2| we get,
v(S1 ∪ S2)− r
2(|S2| − |S
′
2\S1|+ |S
′
2|) ≥ v(S1 ∪ S
′
2)− r
2|S′2|. (12)
By optimality of S′2 for price r2 and S2 ∩ (S′2 ∩ S1) = ∅ (as S2 ∩ S1 = ∅),
v(S′2)− r
2|S′2| ≥ v(S2 ∪ (S
′
2 ∩ S1))− r
2(|S2|+ |S
′
2 ∩ S1|) (13)
Adding Eqs. (12) and (13) and canceling r2 terms (|S′2|−|S′2\S1|= |S′2 ∩ S1|),
v(S1 ∪ S2) + v(S
′
2)>v(S1 ∪ S
′
2) + v(S2 ∪ (S
′
2∩S1)) i.e. (14)
v(S2 ∪ S1)− v(S2 ∪ (S
′
2∩S1))>v((S
′
2\S1) ∪ S1)− v(S
′
2) (15)
S2 6⊃ S
′
2\S1 follows from (S′2\S1) ∪ (S′2 ∩ S1) = S′2 and v’s submodularity. 
D Proofs from Section 5
Fix a valuation with maximum H with area AF under its demand curve F. Let L=1 + logm + log n and
AC1=El∼U [0,L][F (ql)ql] be the part of AF covered by a price ql = H2l with l distributed uniformly on 0..L.
From [2], we know AC1=
∫ L
0 F (
H
2x )
H
2xL
−1dx ≥ L−1
∑L
x=1 F (
H
2x )
H
2x ≥
H
4(1+logm+logn) (note F (H)=0).
Theorem 5 Consider k prices qx1= H2x1 ≥ . . .≥qxk =
H
2xk where x1 ≤ · · · ≤ xk are the first (smallest), . . . ,
k-th (largest) order statistics of k iid continuous random variables u1, . . . , uk chosen uniformly at random
in [0, L]. Then these prices cover in expectation an Ω( klogm+logn) fraction of AF .
The following standard (see e.g. [9], Chapter 2) properties of order statistics will be needed in our Theorem’s
proof.
Lemma 9 Let X be a continuous random variable in [0, L] with cumulative distribution function F and
probability density functionf =F ′. Let xd:k be its dthhighest order statistic out of k independent trials. Then
• xj:k’s probability density function is k
(k−1
j−1
)
F (x)j−1(1− F (x))k−jf(x). Thus xd = xd:k’s (F (x) =
x/L, f(x) = 1/L) probability density function is k(k−1d−1)xd−1(L− x)k−dL−k.
• xd+1:k’s distribution conditioned on the next lowest xd:k’s value xd is the same as the distribution of
the lowest order statistic xk−d:k−d out of k − d trials of variable X truncated below xd, i.e. with
probability density function f(x)1−F (xd) for x ∈ [xd, L].
Proof: [of Theorem 5] The expected area covered (recall Def. 6) by these prices is
ACk = Ex1...xk [
k∑
d=1
(F (qxd)− F (qxd−1))qxd ] = Ex1...xk [
k∑
d=1
F (qxd)qxd ]− Ex1...xk [
k−1∑
d=1
F (qxd)qxd+1 ]
= Eu1...uk [
k∑
d=1
F (qud)qud ]−
k−1∑
d=1
Sdk = kAC1 −
k−1∑
d=1
Sdk (16)
where Eq. (16) follows from the fact that the sets {x1, . . . , xk} and {u1, . . . , uk} coincide and we denoted
Sdk = Ex1...xk [F (qxd)qxd+1 ]. We continue by upper bounding each Sdk and then summing them up.
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Using Lemma 9 (the first and the second facts for Eq. (17) and the first fact for Eq. (19)),
Exd+1|xd [qxd+1 ] =
∫ L
xd
(k−d)(L−y)k−d−1
(L−xd)k−d
H
2y dy ≤
∫ L
xd
k−d
L−xd
H
2y dy ≤ 2
k−d
L−xd
H
2xd (17)
Thus Sdk = Ex1...xk [F (qxd)qxd+1 ] = Exd [F (qxd) · Exd+1|xd [qxd+1 ]] (18)
≤
∫ L
0 k
(
k−1
d−1
)
xd−1d (L− xd)
k−dL−kF ( H2xd )2
k−d
L−xd
H
2xd dxd (19)
≤ 2k(k − 1)
(k−2
d−1
)
L−k
∫ L
0 x
d−1
d (L− xd)
k−1−dF ( H2xd )
H
2xd dxd (20)
By summing up for all days d = 1..k−1, we get
ACk ≥ kAC1 − 2k(k − 1)L
−k
k−1∑
d=1
(
k − 2
d− 1
)∫ L
0
xd−1d (L− xd)
k−1−dF (
H
2xd
)
H
2xd
dxd
≥ kAC1 − 2k(k − 1)L
−k
∫ L
0
F (
H
2x
)
H
2x
k−1∑
d=1
(
k − 2
d− 1
)
xd−1(L− x)(k−2)−(d−1)dx
≥ kAC1 − 2k(k − 1)L
−k
∫ L
0
F (
H
2x
)
H
2x
Lk−2dx
≥ kAC1 − 2k(k − 1)L
−12AC1 ≥ k(1−
4(k − 1)
1 + logm+ log n
)
H
4(1 + logm+ log n)

E Additional material from Section 6
Lemma 10 [13] Consider a monotone submodular function f : 1..m → R. Consider random set I by
choosing each buyer in 1..m independently with probability at least p. Then E[f(I)] ≥ p · f(I).
As utilities are quasilinear, the lowest quantity bought can only decrease if the price is scaled by α ≥ 1, but
stays constant if the valuation is also scaled.
Lemma 11 For α≥1, Dαv(p)=Dv(
p
α)andFv(p) ≤ Fαv⊕x(p),∀x≥0.
Proof:[of Lemma 11] Assume Fv(p) > 0 (otherwise second statement trivially holds) and let S ∈ Dv(p)
be a minimal preferred set (by v) at price p: |S| = Fv(p).
We claim that Fαv⊕x(p) > 0; otherwise ∅ ∈ Dαv⊕x(p) implying 0 ≥ αv(S) + x − p|S| > v(S) −
p|S|,contradicting S ∈ Dv(p). Let Sα ∈ Dαv⊕x(p) be a minimal preferred set (by αv ⊕ x) at price p:
|Sα| = Fαv⊕x.
Suppose towards a contradiction Fv(p) > Fαv⊕x(p), implying Sα 6∈ Dv(p). Thus, at price p, S is strictly
preferred by v to Sα i.e.
v(S)− pFv(p) > v(Sα)− pFαv⊕x(p) i.e. (21)
v(S) − v(Sα) > pFv(p)− pFαv⊕x(p) > 0 implying (22)
αv(S) − αv(Sα) > pFv(p)− pFαv⊕x(p) i.e. (23)
αv(S) + x− pFv(p) > αv(Sα) + x− pFαv⊕x(p) (24)
i.e. S is strictly preferred to Sα by αv ⊕ x at p, contradicting Sα ∈ Dαv⊕x(p). 
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Let ϕda(i) = ai(Id\{i}), ϕdb (i) = bi(Id\{i}) be random variables for the influence on buyer i ∈ 1..m\A1
just before day d ∈ 1..k in IEk. Thus ϕ1a(i) = 1, ϕ1b (i) = 0.
Lemma 12 below parallels Theorem 3. It lower bounds the quantity bought by a buyer outside A1 from day
2 up to a given day d.
Lemma 12 Fix buyer i ∈ 1..m with ϕ2a(i) ≥ Ha/3, ϕ2b (i) ≥ Hb/3. Consider a price schedule qx1 > . . . >
qxk−1 as in Def. 7 and fix day d ∈ 2..k. Assume that I is monotone and each buyer’s base valuation has
hereditary maximizers.
Let set Sd ∈ D
S2,...,Sd−1
ϕda(i)vi⊕ϕ
d
b (i)
(Ha/3 · qx1..d−1) be preferred in day d in IEk given (influenced) valuation
ϕda(i)vi ⊕ ϕ
d
b (i) and previously bought bundles S2,. . . ,Sd−1: Then
∑d
δ=2 |Sδ| ≥ Fvi⊕H
b/3
Ha/3
(qxd−1).
Proof:[of Lemma 12]
Sd∈ argmax
S∩
⋃d−1
δ=2 Sδ=∅
{ϕda(i)vi(S ∪
d−1⋃
δ=2
Sδ)⊕ϕ
d
b (i)−H
a/3 · qxd−1 |S| −
d−1∑
δ=2
Ha/3 · qxδ−1 |Sδ|}
Assume wlog that the customer makes the first purchase in day 2 : S2 6= ∅.
By Lemma 11 (α = ϕ2a(i)Ha/3 ≥ 1 and x=
ϕ2b(i)
Ha/3 ), S2 ∈Dϕ2a(i)vi⊕ϕ2b(i) (H
a/3 · qx1) = Dϕ2a(i)
Ha/3
vi⊕
ϕ2
b
(i)
Ha/3
(qx1) and
|S2| ≥F
vi⊕
ϕ2
b
(i)
Ha/3
(qx1)≥Fvi⊕H
b/3
Ha/3
(qx1). Lemma 11 (x= ϕ
2
b(i)−H
b/3
Ha/3 ) implies the second inequality (holding
with equality unless F
vi⊕
Hb/3
Ha/3
(qx1) = 0).
In day d > 2,
⋃d−1
δ=2 Sδ 6= ∅; thus ϕdb (i) is added to ϕda(i)vi(S ∪
⋃d−1
δ=2 Sδ) in the argmax. We get Sd ∈
D
S2,...,Sd−1
vi⊕
ϕd
b
(i)
ϕda(i)
(
Ha/3
ϕda(i)
qx1 , . . . ,
Ha/3
ϕda(i)
qxd−2 ,
Ha/3
ϕda(i)
qxd−1
)
which equalsDS2,...,Sd−1
vi⊕
Hb/3
Ha/3
(
Ha/3
ϕ2a(i)
qx1 , . . . ,
Ha/3
ϕd−1a (i)
qxd−2 ,
Ha/3
ϕda(i)
qxd−1
)
since the current preferred set (see Eq. (2)) is invariant to additions of scalars and to modifications of earlier
prices (but not to current price, i.e. Ha/3
ϕda(i)
qxd−1) given at least one earlier purchase. Clearly, since vi has
hereditary maximizers, so does vi ⊕ x. Theorem 3 for prices H
a/3
ϕ2a(i)
qx1 , . . . ,
Ha/3
ϕd−1a (i)
qxd−2 ,
Ha/3
ϕda(i)
qxd−1 yields∑d
δ=2 |Sδ|≥Fvi⊕H
b/3
Ha/3
(H
a/3
ϕda(i)
qxd−1). As I , ai and bi are monotone, ϕda(i)≥ϕ2a(i)≥Ha/3. By Lemma 11 for
α = ϕ
d
a(i)
Ha/3 ≥ 1, Fvi⊕H
b/3
Ha/3
(H
a/3
ϕda(i)
qxd−1) ≥ Fvi⊕H
b/3
Ha/3
(qxd−1). 
By Lemma 2.1 in [13], re-stated above as Lemma 10, as ai, bi are submodular and monotone and I is
monotone, the expected influence on a buyer i after the day 1 give-away in IEk is at least half the maximum
influence. This implies that a constant fraction of such buyers are significantly influenced.
Lemma 13 For any buyer i ∈ 1..m, E[ϕ2a(i)] ≥ 0.5Ha and E[ϕ2b(i)] ≥ 0.5Hb. Therefore P[ϕ2a(i) ≥
Ha/3] ≥ 14 and P[ϕ
2
b(i)≥H
b/3] ≥ 14 .
Proof:We only provide the proof for ϕ2a(i) – the one for ϕ2b(i) is similar. Let x = P[ϕ2a(i) ≥ Ha/3].
We have E[ϕ2a(i)] ≤ xHa + (1 − x)Ha/3. The claim follows via simple algebra from E[ϕ2a(i)] ≥ H
a
2(Lemma 13). 
Finally, we prove Theorem 6, i.e. IEk’s O( logmnk )-revenue approximation
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Proof:[of Theorem 6] By Lemma 13, ϕ2a(i) ≥ Ha/3 for a constant fraction of buyers outside A1. By
Lemma 12, for any day d = 2..k, each such buyer i ∈ 1..m\A1 buys at least F
vi⊕
Hb/3
Ha/3
(qxd−1) items in total
in days 2..d at prices Ha/3 · qx1 , ..,Ha/3 · qxd−1 .
For qδ = Ha/3 · qxδ−1 and xδ = Fvi⊕Hb/3Ha/3
(qxδ−1) for δ = 2..k in Lemma 7 we get that buyer i pays at least
∑k
δ=2H
a/3 · qxδ−1(Fvi⊕H
b/3
Ha/3
(qxδ)− Fvi⊕H
b/3
Ha/3
(qxδ−1)) ≥ H
a/3 · Ω( klogmn)(Hi +
Hb/3
Ha/3 )
by Theorem 4. The approximation factor follows after noting that the optimal marketing strategy can yield
revenue at most
∑
i∈1..m(HiH
a +Hb). 
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